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In the Supreme Court of 
The State of Utah 
TONY FLEl.VIETIS and 
KATINA FLEME·TIS, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
- vs.-
J. WILLIAM McARTHUR and 
MOSELLE ·McARTHUR, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 7345 
CR.espondents' Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In order that the court will have a clear picture of the 
background out of which this lawsuit arose, plaintiffs deem 
it necessary to point out the following facts in addition to 
those set forth by the defendants. 
The escrow sales agreement covered four 40's of good 
land and one 40 of arid, unimproved land. ·The aggregate 
purchase price was Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000). 
The land is all in the same section. The- defendants entered 
into possession thereof and paid sufficient of the purchase 
price that they were entitled, pursuant to the terms of the 
agreement, to receive the deeds and water certificates on 
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2 
the good land. The appellants also received the assignments 
on the Indian lease lands which were held by plaintiffs and 
used in connection with the entire farm. The defendant 
McArthur testified (Abstract bottom page 31) that the 
poor 40 was "good for nothing". Nevertheless Two Thou-
sand Dollars ($2,000) of the twelve-thousand-dollar pur-
chase price was held back pending the clearing of title de-
fects on this poor 40. It is this Two Thousand Dollars 
($2,000) and interest which plaintiffs sue to recover. 
On August 8, 1946, after defendants had been in pos-
session of all of said property, including said Indian leases, 
for in excess of one year they sold ~and transferred the good 
land and the Indian leases to one J. T. Bergstrom, a third 
party. Moreover, on June 14, 1945, they granted a ten-year 
lease on the oil and gas rights under the poor 40 to the 
Sinclair Wyoming Oil Company for a period of ten years, 
namely from June 14, 1945, to June 14, 1955; and finally, 
on January 6, 1947, they sold the poor 40 to the same J. T. 
Bergstrom and the said deed signed by J. W. McArthur 
was left at the Roosevelt State Bank fior the signature of 
his wife, where it reposed at the time suit was filed. Berg-
strom paid valuable consideration for this deed (Abstract 
pages 14 and 15). 
Plaintiffs maintain that all conditions precedent in the 
contract have been performed by them and that even if 
there were now some title defect, defendants would not be 
entitled to rescind the contract as to the poor 40 because 
they have taken the good portions of the land and all of the 
water right and the Indian leases and have s'Old and assigned 
the same, and they have leased the underground rights on 
the poor 40 in question and have in truth and in fact ex-
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ecuted a deed to the fee title thereof, which deed is held by 
the Roosevelt State Bank for delivery to the said Berg-
strom. Defendants cannot rescind under such circum-
stances. 
I will proceed first to meet the three arguments of de-
fendants as set forth in their brief. 
I 
RESERVATIONS IN THE PATENT 
The first point which the defendants raise is that the 
plaintiffs have failed to perform their conditions precedent 
inasmuch as there is a reservation in the patent which the 
defendants claim constitutes a cloud or defect in the title 
and affects its marketability. This was an extremely inter-
esting point of law a few years ago. At that time there 
was some question as to whether or not such a reservation 
constituted a defect in the title. There is no longer any 
.question, and I am ~ertain that the following authorities 
will amply sustain the statement I have just made. If the 
court were to hold with the defendants on this proposition, 
it would mean the opening of the floodgates of litigation as 
the courts have stated. Practically all of the warranty 
deeds which we have made for years. would be subject to 
suit. 
The reservation set forth in the patent at Entry 4 in 
the abstract was inserted in the patent pursuant to an act 
of Oongress. The act is as follows and may be found in 
Title 43, United States Code Annotated, Section 945: 
"Reservation in patents of right of way for 
ditches or canals. In all patents for lands taken up 
after August 30, 1890, under any of the land laws 
. of the United States or on entries or claims vali-
dated by the Act of August 30, 1890, west of the 
one hundredth meridian, it shall be expressed that 
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there is reserved from the lands in said patent 
described a right of way thereon for ditches or 
canals constructed by the authodty of the United 
States. (Aug. 30, 1890, c. 837, Section 1, 26 Stat. 
391.)" 
This section in U. S. C. A. is annotated. The impor-
tant annotations, however, appear in the Cumulative An-
nual Pocket Parts of 1947. There the controlling cases are 
set forth. 
Defendants in their brief, page 10, state that, "by 
such reservations the courts have construed the same to 
be a limitation of title ... " The defendants fail, however, 
to set forth a single case or authority which sustains their 
position. The case of Griffith vs. Cole, 264 Federal 396 
cited by defendants in their brief 'at the top of page 10 is 
not remotely in point. I am unable to find the other case 
cited ,that of U. S. vs. Haga, 271 Federal 41, cited at the 
top of page 10 of the brief. None of the cases set forth on 
pages 12 and 13 appear to be in point. So much for de-
fendants' brief on this point. 
Maupin on Marketable Title to Real Estate, 3rd Edi-
tion, page 383, states that the purchaser must take notice of 
public statutes restricting the use of the granted premises; 
and such restrictions constitute no breach of the covenant 
of warranty. 
The fundamental point to be borne in mind in con-
sidering this objection raised by the defendants is that 
we have a public statute involved, and the same must be 
noticed by all parties dealing with land. 
The rule i~s well stated by Brandeis in the Farmers & 
Merchants Bank vs. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 
43 Supreme Court 651, 67 L. Ed. 1157, and 30 A. L. R. 635 as 
frollows: 
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"Laws which subsist at the time and place of 
the making of a contract, and where it is to be per-
formed, enter into and form a part of it, as fully 
as if they had been expressly r.eferred to or incor-
porated in its terms~ This principal embraces alike 
those laws which affect its construction and those 
which affect its enforcement or discharge." 
There are two recent cases which are squarely in 
point and which, in my judgment, are controlling in reas~n 
and in authority on the specific point at issue. These two 
cases, one decided by the Supreme Court of the State of 
Washington on January 17, 1942, and one decided by the 
supreme court of South Dakota on January 22, 1942, were, 
of course, decided independently. They both arrive at the 
same conclusion, and they both involve as a defense the 
specific statute which has been raised by the defendants 
in this case. I might point out, however, that in my judg-
ment the Supreme Court of the State of Washington has 
done a much better job of analysis, perhaps because they 
are a little closer to the scene of irrigation here in the 
West. These cases are: 
Walsh vs. Bellamy, (South Dak<ota) 2 Northwestern 
2nd 102. In this case the parties entered into a contract 
whereby the plaintiff obligated herself to convey the prem-
ises by good and sufficient warranty deed free and clear 
of all liens and encumbrances and to furnish abstract of 
title showing the title to the premises to be in merchant-
able condition and free and clear of all liens and encum-
brances. Please observe that this is almost identically the 
provision of the Flemetis-McArthur contract before us. The 
defendant pleaded as a defense that the title was not free 
and clear of liens and encumbrances because of the right 
of way reservation in the patent which was inserted pur-
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suant to the Act of Congress which I have heretofore quoted 
in full in this brief. 
The court quotes from Maupin on Marketable Title rs. J 
and sets forth the cases which are cited in that work in ta3e 
support of the doctrine hereinabove announced, namely the :::le 1 
case of Neeson, et al vs. Bray, 19 New York Supplement d·e 
841, and the case of Richardson-Kellett Company vs. Kline, (ourt 
70 Florida 23, 69 Southern 203. The court points out that non i1 
in the latter case it was held that in the conveyance of a The~ 
part of the Everglades swamp land a reservation of a right !ortb 
in favor of the State to enter upon the land for the pur- whlcb 
pose of constructing a system of drainage canals, if neces- tion i1 
sary, did not .render the title defective. The court also cites there 
the case of In Thomas vs. Wood, 37 Federal 2nd 856, which ;E~~; 
appears to hold the same as the Kline case. The court in ratlor 
that case states: 
"The restrictions are a matter of public knowl-
edge and the parties dealing with the title contract 
with reference thereto, and the restrictions be-
come a part of the contract of sale and purchase." 
Apparently the only case which is cited to the con-
trary is the case of Cosby vs. Danziger, 38 California Appeal 
204, 175 Pacific 809. That ease, however, is not an author-
ity against the general propositions hereinabove cited. The 
Walsh vs. Bellamy case under West Keynote 7 at page 
105 of 2 Northwest 2nd distinguishes that case, and the 
Cosby vs. Danziger case is even more clearly distinguished 
in the Washington case which I will presently cite. The 
important point of disrtinction to notice is that in the Cosby 
vs. Danziger case the patent hadn't been recorded, and the 
buyer didn't know under what chain of title he would fall. 
The case is clearly distinguishable and is distinguished by 
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both of these recent 1942 Supren:te Court decisions. 
I think the best case on the subject is that of Dopps 
vs. Alderman, (Washington) 121 Pacific 2nd 388. In this 
case there was a contract for sale by good and marketable 
title and there was pleaded the specific reservation which 
is pleaded by defendants in this action, and the Supreme 
Court of the State of Washington holds that that reserva-
tion in the patent does not constitute a defect in the title. 
The court makes a good analysis of the entire subject, sets 
forth the authorities and texts, and distinguishes the cases 
which were cited in opposition to the doctrine. The distinc-
tion in the case of Cosby vs. Danziger is pointed out, and 
there are additional cases cited for support of the proposi-
tion first hereinabove advanced, namely that such a reser-
vation in the patent does not constitute a defect in the title. 
It is my understanding that defendants do not con-
tend that the existence of the Indian canal which runs 
across the 40 in question constitutes any defect in the 
title. They did not so contend at the trial and if I read 
their brief correctly, do not apparently so contend on ap-
peal, and I am certain that even if they were now to make 
such contention that the same could not be sustained. They, 
of course, knew that large canal was on the premises when 
they made the contract. The court so found. The leading 
case on this proposition where there is a visible canal ease-
ment is Schurger vs. Moorman, . decided by the Supreme 
Court of Idaho in 1911, 117 Pacific 122. This case is cited in 
all of the texts and by most of the subsequent cases.' In 
that case there was a canal running across the land of the 
plaintiff, which is a parallel situation to ~he Indian canal 
which runs across the 40-acre parcel involved in this law-
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suit. The issues involved in that case are well set forth 
by the court at page 123 as follows: 
"The appellant contends that the easement 
and right of way for a canal across the lands con-
stitutes an incumbrance, and would amount to a 
breach of the covenant against incumbrances on 
the land. The respondent, on the other hand, in-
sists that an easement and right of way for an 
irrigation canal, being an obvious and notorious 
servitude upon the land and being of permanent 
character and essential for the reclamation of an 
arid country, does not fall within the category 
of incumbrances against which a convenant of war-
ranty runs." 
The court holds that the existence of a canal which is 
a permanent easement did not impair the marketability of 
the title. The essence of the decision and of the great many 
cases which support the same. proposition is that parties 
who contract concerning a piece of property over which 
runs visible easements such as a highway or a large per-
manent waterway are presumed to have had knowJedge 
of the existence of such easements and to have contracted 
with reference to them. This Idaho case cites a great num-
ber of cases from throughout the United States on this 
general proposition, and all of these cases with the excep-
tion of a few old Eastern decisions sustain the proposition 
which I have mentioned and which is set forth in the Idaho 
case. 
'Brewster on Conveyancing, Section 203, states: 
"In cases where there is a physical burden of 
this sort, which is visible, there is a fair and rea-. 
sonable presumption, in the absence of an express 
agreement, that both parties act with reference 
to this plain, existing burden, and that the vendor 
on the one hand demands, and the vendee on the 
other pays, only the fair value of the land as vis-
1l.1ent 
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ably incumbered. Therefore, it is said such bur-
dens, by way of open and notorious easements, 
are not really incumbrances wi'thin the meaning 
of this covenant, because the real subject-matter 
of the dealings between the grantor and the 
grantee is the land, subject to visible easements." 
See the case of Sisk vs. Caswell, a California case, in 
122 Pacific 185. There is a presumption, the California 
court states, under all authorities that the parties act 
with reference to a plain, existing easement or burden 
when they contract pertaining to the land. This is so of 
those burdens or easements which are permanent in their 
nature. 
See also the case of Feldhut vs. Brummitt, a Kansas 
case, reported in 150 Pacific 549 and decided in 1915. This 
case holds that an established irrigation ditch, plainly ob-
servable on the property was not an encumbrance to the 
extent of being a breach of covenant. This Kansas case 
cites the Colorado case of Erikson vs. Whitescarver, 57 
Colorado 409, 142 Pacific 413. The Kansas case, however, 
does not carefully analyze the Colorado case and apparent-
ly thinks that the Colorado case is a contrary decision; 
whereas, in truth and in fact, it is not as a reading of the 
case will clearly disclose. 
The Colorado case last referred to involved a sale of 
some building lots in the City of Denver. There were some 
ditch rights of way across these city building lots. The 
court held that they constituted a breach of the warranty 
against encumbrances. The court, however, makes the fol-
lowing significant statement: 
"What might be the rule where lands encum-
bered by a right of way for an irrigation ditch 
and conveyed for agricultural purposes of which 
the vendee had notice at the time of the con-
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veyance is not involved and what we have said 
on the subject of any such easement is confined 
and limited to the facts before us." 
II 
THE STRAY MORTGAGE AT ENTRY 10 OF ABSTRACT 
The ~ppeUants next complain of the mortgage shown 
at Entry 10 in the Abstract of Title. This mortgage was 
executed by a stranger to the title. It does not specifically 
purport to even cover the 40 in question. It covered the 
water and rights of way of the Farmers Irrigation Com-
pany which ran across Section 1, Towns:hip 1 South, Range 
4 West of the Uintah Special Meridian, of which this 40 
was a part. The court found, and the evidence sustains 
the finding, that no portion of the canal or lateral system 
of the Farmers Irrigation Company touched the 40 in 
question, and this 40 had no water right whatsoever in 
the Farmers Irrigation Company or in any other company 
at all. I think the rule is well established that a mortgage 
executed by a stranger to the title is not a defect so long 
as there is no occupant of the property claiming under 
such instrument and the purchaser has no actual knowledge 
of a valid claim by parties who are strangers to the title 
(Title Standard No. _9 Utah State Bar, Bar Bulletin Au-
gust 19, 1947, and cases there cited). Because of the fact 
that no portion of the Farmers Irrigation Company canal 
or lateral system touched the land in question and because 
it is an arid 40 having no water right whatsoever, this mort-
gage by a stranger to the title covering waters and ease-
ments does not constitute a defect impairing the market-
ability of the title. 
lt is true there were some ditches on the 40 in question 
which were used to transport waste water from the Dry 
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Gulch Irrigation Company which was transported through 
the Farmers Irrigation Company canal, but these small 
ditches were constructed subsequent to the date of the ex-
ecution of the stray mortgage. The mortgage was executed 
and recorded in the year 1935. The ditches were not con-
structed until after the plaintiffs acquired the property in 
1939. Said mortgage executed four years before these waste 
ditches were constructed could not possibly affect them. 
It will also be observed that an auditor's tax deed on 
the property was executed on April 10, 1937. The case of 
Hanson vs. Burris 46 Pacific 2nd 400 at pages 406 and 407 
stands for the proposition that a purchaser from the Coun-
ty takes a new and complete title _in the land under an 
independent grant of sovereign authority which bars or 
extinguishes all prior claims. 
Defendants cannot successfully set up this stray mort-
gage in defense of the action. I repeat there was no mort-
gage on any water right belonging to this 40-acre tract 
simply because there was no water right whatsoever, and 
the mortgage was not upon any easement or right of way 
over this 40, first, because no ditch was constructed until 
after the mortgage was given; second, because no right 
of way was ever deeded to the Farmers Irrigation Com-
pany (the abstract of title shows none); third, no such 
right of way was acquired by the Farmers Irrigation Com-
pany by -prescription because the p~escriptive period could 
not have run; fourth, a new title was initiated in plaintiffs 
through the issuance of an auditor''s tax deed after the 
mortgage was given; and fifth, defendants used these 
ditches themselves for the benefit of both their good and 
poor land, and they are in no position to complain becauae 
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of their existence. They knew that they were there at the 
time they made the contract, and they must be held to have 
made the contract in contemplation of these small waste 
ditches. 
III 
CAROLINA(E) THOMPSON DEED 
In their brief defendants for the first time claim a 
defect in the title because at Entry 8 of the abstract of title 
the quit claim deed from Duchesne County runs to' one 
Carolina(e) Thompson. This alleged defect was never 
urged at the trial, was not argued orally, and was not so 
much as mentioned in the written trial brief filed by the 
defendants_. The only defects urged or considered at the 
trial or in the briefs were those hereinbefore set forth under 
Topics I and II pertaining to the reservations in the patent 
and the stray mortgage at Entry 10 of the abstract of title. 
Defendants are put to rather strange and forced sea-
soning when they state in their brief at the bottom of page 
10 that, "There is no instrument in said abstract disclos-
ing that the title of Carolina Thompson has been divested 
of him ('Sic) or that his wife (sic) has been divested of her 
inchoate right." Throughout all of the months of prep-
aration on this case and the intensive work done at the £a 
trial it never occurred to defendants that the name Caro .. 
lina(e) Thompson referred to other than a female. Now ~:~f; 
the first time, in an effort to defeat plaintiffs of their )JOn! 
just dues under the contract defendants have discovered 
that the word Carolina (e) is of masculine gender! Caro- da\n 
lina Thompson made, executed and delivered deed to Fie~- tim~ 
etis November 15, 1939. the 
* * * * * 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
I believe that the foregoing cases and arguments amply 
meet the contentions of defendants in their brief. As 
pointed out above, however, the position of the defendants 
is that even after having accepted all of the good land and 
all of the water under the contract and having sold and 
disposed of the same and after having accepted and trans~ 
ferred the Indian leases and after having conveyed the 
underground rights on the poor 40 in question and having 
executed a deed to J. T. Bergstrom therefor in 1947, two 
years after the contract was made, that they are now in a 
position to rescind the contract as to this worthless 40 and 
withhold the payment of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000) 
on the contract. 
The defendants cannot rescind the contract under the 
facts and circumstances disclosed under any theory of the 
case. 
IV 
REMEDY OF RESCISSION 
In considering the doctrine of rescission the court 
should bear in mind these propositions : 
1. There must be no other adequate legal remedy. 
2. Rescission is a proceeding in equity, and it must be 
just and equitable under the circumstances of the case. 
3. The defendants must show that they can place the 
other party in statu quo, that is the party pleading rescis~ 
sion must be able to restore the consideration. 
4. Since rescission is a proceeding in equity the . party 
claiming it must act in. good faith and within a reasonable 
time. An unreasonable delay prevents the imposition of 
the doctrine. 
Defendants, in order to invoke the doctrine of rescis ... 
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sion, must come into court in an equitable position them-
selves. They do not thus present themselves according to 
the admitted facts, because: 
(1) Defendant McArthur knew of the existence of the 
small ditches and of the Indian canal upon the 40 in ques-
tion at the time he made the contract, and he certainly 
knew of their existence after he took possession of the 
property. 
(2) Notwithstanding this fact and after his perfect 
knowledge of the condition of the premises, he made and 
entered into a written ten-year lease on the underground 
rights covering the forty in litigation to the Sinclair Wyo-
ming Oil Company. That lease appears in the abstract of 
title at Entry 24. Defendants receive Fifty Dollars ($50) 
annual rental. They have been receiving that rental and 
presumably are still receiving it, and they have the right 
also to receive one-eighth of the oil and gas produced and 
sold from the premises. The fact of their execution of that 
ten-year lease on the underground rights on this particular 
40 would bar them from bringing a proceeding for rescis-
sion if there were no other principal involved. How can these 
defendants have the hardihood to come into a court of 
equity and ask this court to compel the plaintiffs to take 
back this . worthless land and lose Two Thousand Dollars 
when they have executed a ten-year lease on the under-
ground· rights and have received the rental therefrom, all 
of which was done after the defendants went into actual 
physical possession of the land and_ knew of the existence 
of the canal and ditches thereon, and after they had actual-
ly used these ditches for the irrigation of a portion of this 
40-acre parcel ? 
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(3) The defendants did more than this. After they 
had gone into possession and after they had leased the un-
derground rights on the 40 in question, they proceeded in 
full knowledge of all of the facts to ·sell the entire wateT 
right and all the valuable 40's of the farm which they had 
contracted to purchase. In order to have rescission the de-
fendants must be in a position to restore to the other party 
the consideration received. It is utterly impossible for the 
defendants to make any such restoration of ~he property 
because they have sold the good land and water rights as 
well as the Indian leases which were covered by the con-
tract. They have sold the underground rights on the 40 in 
question, and they have, in truth and in fact, sold the 40-
acre parcel itself. 
( 4) Plaintiffs introduced in evidence the three-hun-
dred-dollar check dated January 6, 1947, which defendant 
McArthur received from one J. T. Bergstrom, a third party, 
in payment of the purchase price for this 40-acre tract. We 
also introduced the quit claim deed which defendant Mc-
Arthur executed thereon and left at the Roosevelt State 
Bank for the signature of his wife. So we have a situation 
wherein the defendants have actually sold this land which 
is the subject of our present lawsuit and upon which they 
seek a rescission. This is contrary to all of the law concern-
Ing this doctrine, and it is utterly impossible for defendants 
to have a rescission of this contract when they have sold 
the land which is the suhject of the suit. In order to 
have a rescission they would have to restore the considera-
tion, namely the good land as well as the poor land, and take 
their money back. Defendants_ are not in a position to do 
this. They do not offer to restore anything. They do not 
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offer to do equity. They seek to get out of ·a just obliga-
tion to pay Two Thousand Dollars to plaintiffs. 
(5) Let me point out one other reason why Mc-
Arthur cannot have a rescission. It is unquestioned that 
defendants received transfer of the Indian lands referred 
to in the contract, and it is further unquestioned that de-
fendants irrevocably transferred these Indian lands to 
Bergstrom, a third party, and if plaintiffs are now com-
pelled to take back this 40-acre parcel of land, they stand 
deprived of the Indian lease lands which plaintiffs yielded 
to defendants when the contract was made. It is utterly 
impossible to find that defendants under any theory of the 
case are entitled to rescission. 
(6) An unreasonable delay prevents the imposition 
of the doctrine. 8 Thompson on Real Property at page 589 
sets forth the rule as follows: 
"The right to rescind may be lost by laches. 
The law requires the injured person to seek his re-
medy without unreasonable delay after discovering 
the facts justifying rescission. A person cannot be 
deprived of his remedy in equity on the grounds of 
laches unless it appears that he had, or ought to 
have had, knowledge of his rights. Upon discovery 
of the grounds entitling him to rescission, he must 
act with reasonable promptness to avoid the impu-
tation of acquiescence, and he must act under cir-
·cumstances consistent with good faith. The period 
within which the right of rescission must be exer-
cised is to be. determined by the facts peculiar to 
each case." 
I do not think that there can be any question but what 
defendants in this case have not acted with reasonable dis-
patch in asserting rescission. The contract was made in 
1945, and defendants entered into possession of the pro-
perty and after becoming fully apprised of all of the facts 
~:an r 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
17 
and circumstances concerning the same, they sat by for a 
period of two years and as late an January 6, 1947, treated 
the contract now before the court as being in full force and 
effect because on the latter date they delivered the deed to 
the 40-acre tract, which is the subject of this suit, at the 
Roosevelt State Bank in favor of the third party, Berg-
strom. 
If there were now some title defect (which we deny) 
defendants' remedy would be for damages and not for recis-
sion. 
CONCLUSION 
All principals of law and equity and ali evidence, in 
my judgement, lead to the conclusion that judgement in 
this case must be sustained. This scheme of defendants to 
get everything that was any good from plaintiffs, namely 
the good land, the water rights, and the Indian lands; and 
to try and turn back an unimproved, rocky, arid 40-acre tract 
now encumbered by a ten-year lease of underground rights 
and an outstanding deed in favor of a third party Berg-
strom on the surface rights; and retain Two Thousand Dol-
lars of the agreed consideration, smacks of bad faith if 
not something worse. This court should not lend its aid 
thereto. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THERALD N. JENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondents 
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